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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 930696-CA 
v. : 
THEODIS WHITE, JR., : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for attempted 
murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-203 (Supp. 1993), in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable David S. Young, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is: 
1. Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence 
the victim's blood-stained shirt and pants over defendant's 
objection that such evidence was substantially more prejudicial 
than probative? "To find that an error has been made in 
admitting evidence in the face of a rule 403 objection, [the 
reviewing court] must conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in permitting the challenged evidence to be received. 
Specifically, [the reviewing court] must find that the ruling in 
favor of admissibility was beyond the limits of reasonability. 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)." State v. 
Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 28 (Utah 1994). 
"A trial court that acts unreasonably has committed 
legal error. Therefore, when reviewing a trial court's decision 
to admit evidence under Rule 403, [the reviewing court] 
assess [es] whether, as a matter of law, the trial court acted 
reasonably in striking the balance." State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 
694, 699 n. 5 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (1993) 
(citing State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993) ^  
Even if [the reviewing court] find[s] that the trial 
court's decision to admit was 'beyond the limits of 
reasonability,' it will reverse only if the error was harmful, 
i.e., if absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an 
outcome more favorable to the defendant. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
at 1221 (citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
1
 In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the court 
addressed the particular reasons for applying the correctness 
standard to an assessment of an alleged gruesome photograph: 
The correctness standard of review should be 
applied to the gruesomeness determination 
because an appellate court is in as good a 
position as the trial court to view the 
photograph. See State v. Thurman, 203 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 18, 23 (January 7, 1993). More 
important, the characterization as 'gruesome' 
is less a factual question than a legal one 
because it is a predicate for shifting the 
presumption of admissibility that normally 
obtains under rule 403. See [State v.1 
Dibello, 780 P.2d [1221], 1229 [(Utah 1989)]; 
cf. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23, 26. 
2 
rules are compiled in Appendix A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Theodis White, Jr., was charged by 
information with attempted criminal homicide, murder, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 
1993) (R. 06). Prior to trial defendant filed a notice of intent 
to rely on a defense of diminished capacity (R. 18). 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the 
crime as charged and sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison (R. 178). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At about 1:00 a.m. on May 23, 1993, David "Todd" 
Eggleston, Paul Keenan and Kevin "Jake" Barney were returning to 
their homes in Todd's car (R. 253, 272, 274, 287-88, 322). 
Eastbound on 8th South, David moved into the left-hand turn lane 
to make a turn onto 3rd East (R. 255). While waiting at the stop 
light, a brown Celica with three people in it, including 
defendant, pulled alongside Todd's car (R. 255-57, 323). 
The drivers of the two cars exchanged some words (R. 
257, 289). The driver of the brown Celica, Joshua Sparacino (R. 
377), made gestures as though inviting a fight with Todd (R. 257-
58, 279). The drivers flipped each other off (raised middle 
finger) (R. 257-58, 289)• 
As Todd turned north onto to 3rd East, the brown Celica 
also turned and pulled alongside Todd's car, its passengers and 
driver yelling and telling those in Todd's car to pull over (R. 
3 
258, 324). Defendant, hanging out of the window of the Celica's 
front passenger door and waving a knife, screamed, "Tonight's 
your night," and that he was going to kill those in Todd's car 
(R. 257-58, 262, 281, 323-24). 
Looking to avoid a knife fight, Todd turned right onto 
7th South and then right again onto 7th east and sped up to 
forty-five miles per hour (R. 260-61). The Celica caught up. 
Todd accelerated up to sixty-five to seventy miles per hour as he 
drove south on 7th East, but the Celica pursued him. As the 
brown Celica chased Todd's car down 7th East, defendant continued 
to lean out the window, threatening, screaming and waving the 
knife (R. 261-62, 281, 289-90, 292-93, 313-16, 325-26, 353-55). 
Paul described defendant's demeanor as "crazed" and 
"uncontrollably [angry]" (R. 297). 
At 13th South Todd made a hard right turn, then a left 
onto 5th East, followed by a couple of other turns, the last of 
which left them in a dead end (R. 263, 326-27). Todd was turning 
his car around when the Celica entered the street. He completed 
his turn and drove back down the street, colliding with the 
Celica as he exited (R. 263-65, 290, 301, 327). 
Todd got back on 7th East and drove south, trying to 
get away, but was again pursued by the Celica (R. 265). At 33rd 
South Todd turned right, drove to 5th East and then made a couple 
of more turns into a neighborhood development (R. 266, 327). 
Thinking they had lost the Celica, the young men exited the car 
to inspect the damage to the right fender (R. 3 01, 328). 
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As they worked on the car, the Celica came screeching 
into the street and stopped right next to Todd's car (R. 267, 
328, 357). Before the Celica stopped moving, defendant got out 
of it, waving the knife (R. 303, 328) . Todd immediately ran to 
the Seven-Eleven at 33rd South and 5th East (R. 271). He was 
followed by Paul, who first stood his ground to fight, but fled 
after Sparacino hit him beneath the left eye (R. 294-95, 329). 
Kevin, thinking they would escape by driving away, 
jumped into the passenger seat of Todd's car and quickly began 
rolling up the window. Defendant, however, leaned through the 
open driver's side window and began attacking him with the knife, 
saying, ff[t]his is what you deserve, now you're going to die," 
while Kevin screamed for defendant to get off him (R. 329, 335, 
359). During the attack, Sparacino tried to get at Kevin by 
punching at the closed passenger window, while the third person 
in the Celica, Twila Lu Jan, egged defendant and Sparacino on by 
screaming, "Get him, get him" (R. 335, 363). 
Finally, Kevin was able to push defendant away, jump 
out of the car and run to the Seven-Eleven (R. 335-36). Already 
at the Seven-Eleven, Todd observed that the whole bottom leg of 
Kevin's pants and his shirt were blood-soaked (R. 272-73). The 
shirt and pants (Exhibits 15 and 16, respectively) were admitted 
in evidence over defendant's objection (R. 309-312, 332-34) . 
Paul testified that Kevin looked bad when he arrived at the 
seven-eleven, "carrying his guts" and "losing a lot of blood" (R. 
295) . 
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In the course of his attack, defendant stabbed Kevin in 
his extremities and trunk eight times, including once in the 
chest and once in the abdomen (R. 33 0, 372) . L.D.S. Hospital 
surgeon Dr. Dirk Noyes testified that, had the knife not been 
blocked by a rib, defendant might have stabbed Kevin in the heart 
(R. 373). He also stated that the six-inch deep wound to the 
abdomen had perforated the stomach, causing the omentum (a piece 
of fat attached to the stomach), to extrude from the stomach. 
That wound presented a dangerous condition from which one would 
die from infection without surgical repair (R. 371-73) . 
Detective Richard Judd, after determining that 
defendant had been involved in the stabbing, had a conversation 
with him on June 1, 1993 (R. 376-78). After waiving his Miranda 
rights, defendant told a confusing story of the events of May 
23rd (R. 3 81) . However, defendant finally admitted that he had 
stabbed Kevin (R. 382). Defendant also told detective Judd that 
he had drunk about a pint of alcohol, but denied that he had 
taken cocaine "or anything." Defendant also told detective Judd 
that he was an epileptic, but was not taking his medicine, 
Dilantin, because it made him sick (R. 386-87). 
At trial defendant did not challenge the prosecution's 
evidence that he had stabbed Kevin. Rather, his defense was that 
he was mentally ill. 
Dr. Stephen Golding, professor of psychology at the 
University of Utah, was one of the experts appointed by the court 
to evaluate defendant (R. 414-416). He testified that defendant 
6 
had experienced a very chaotic and sexually and physically 
abusive upbringing, in which he had been forced to witness and 
experience a lot of violence (R. 419) . In particular, defendant 
witnessed his father shoot his (the father's) girlfriend and kill 
the girlfriend's sister, and thereafter, he witnessed his 
father's attempted suicide (R. 419-20). 
After defendant's father went to prison, defendant and 
his sister were raised by a paternal uncle and his wife who did 
not welcome them in their home (R. 423) . Enraged about his 
living situation, defendant had a violent physical confrontation 
with the uncle, which led to defendant's becoming a ward of the 
State of California, living in various foster homes before coming 
to Utah (R. 424) 
As a result of this upbringing, Dr. Golding stated, 
defendant turned to drugs for escape, becoming a multiple 
substance abuser (R. 425). During their interview, defendant 
told Dr. Noyes that on the night of the stabbing he had taken two 
or three hits of LSD and consumed a fair amount of alcohol (R. 
429). Dr. Golding said that defendant, conditioned by random and 
chaotic violence and disinhibited by drugs, becomes 
uncontrollably enraged when confronted by relatively trivial 
situations, an example of which was an explosive and destructive 
blowup with his father, about six months prior to the stabbing, 
when another person apparently cheated at dominoes. (R. 427, 431-
37, 465-66). 
Dr. Golding's clinical opinion was that defendant's 
7 
capacities were diminished and that the initial confrontation in 
the cars triggered a blind rage associated with his diminished 
capacity and drug ingestion (R. 467). He also thought that 
defendant's awareness that he had said someone was going to die 
would have been significantly diminished, but that defendant 
would probably have known that he had a knife in his hand (R. 
486) . 
Dr. Mark Rindflesh, a psychiatrist specializing in 
forensic psychiatry, was also appointed by the trial court to 
evaluate defendant (R. 494-96). In rebuttal, he testified that 
the condition which Dr. Golding ascribed to defendant was not 
recognized by the most commonly used psychiatric diagnostic 
reference, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III, Revised 
Edition (hereinafter "DSM-III") (R. 497-99). He rejected the 
possibility that defendant suffered from another condition cited 
in the DSM-III, i.e. intermittent explosive disorder, because all 
of defendant's extreme rages resulted from more-than-trivial 
stimuli, a criterion of the condition (R. 499-500).2 
The jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder (R. 
550) . 
2
 On cross-examination Dr. Rindflesh acknowledged that he 
had not initially determined that defendant suffered from 
intermittent explosive disorder because he had not been supplied 
with the same information that Dr. Golding had (R. 504-05). 
However, he also stated that his opinion, that defendant did not 
suffer from intermittent explosive disorder, was also based on 
what he had heard in court, i.e., Dr. Golding's testimony (R. 
500). He also stated that Dr. Golding and he agreed that 
defendant did not meet the criteria for intermittent explosive 
disorder (R. 504). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The blood-stained pants and shirt are not gruesome and, 
by any reasonable assessment, far less abhorrent than 
photographic evidence found improperly admitted in Utah cases. 
Blood-stained clothing does not belong to a specialized class of 
evidence having an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice the 
jury. The challenged evidence was relevant to show the nature 
and cause of the victim's wounds. In any event, any error in 
admitting the clothing was harmless because there was substantial 
evidence that defendant was aware that he had stabbed the victim, 
notwithstanding disputed expert testimony about his diminished 
capacity. Also, the State did not overplay its use of the blood-
stained clothing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BLOOD-STAINED CLOTHES WERE NOT GRUESOME 
AND WERE RELEVANT TO PROVE THAT THE VICTIM'S 
WOUNDS WERE CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S KNIFE 
ATTACK. MOREOVER, ANY ERROR IN ADMITTING THE 
CLOTHES WAS HARMLESS. 
At trial defendant .moved to exclude the admission of 
Kevin Barney's blood-stained clothing under rule 403, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, because their appearance would inflame the jury and 
the evidence was cumulative of other expected testimony (R. 3 09-
10). In arguing the prejudicial quality of the evidence, 
defendant acknowledged that he recognized the difference between 
clothes and photographs of a bloody scene, but nevertheless urged 
9 
the trial court to apply the standard used in State v. Cloud, 722 
P.2d 750 (Utah 1986), and find that there were less prejudicial 
sources of information than the blood-stained clothes (R. 310). 
The trial court found that they were physical evidence 
illustrating the nature of defendant's aggression, not offered to 
inflame the jury, and therefore admissible (R. 311-12).3 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that 
ff[e]vidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." 
Relevant evidence, however, may be deemed inadmissible 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
. . . or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Dunn, considering a challenge to an alleged gruesome 
photograph,4 outlined the procedural steps in undertaking a 
review under rule 403: 
"When applying rule 403, it is necessary to 
3
 The transcript of defendant's motion to exclude and the 
trial court's ruling is attached at Addendum B. 
4
 Throughout this brief the State cites cases discussing 
the admissibility of photographs because, apart from State v. 
Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989), Utah's appellate courts have 
not been presented with a challenge to the admissibility of 
blood-stained clothing, and because photographs seem to present 
an analogous frame of reference. The discussion is supplemented 
with caselaw from other jurisdictions dealing with blood-stained 
clothing. 
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determine first whether the proffered 
evidence has an unusual propensity to 
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the 
jury. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 
(Utah 1989); State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). If not, we indulge a 
presumption in favor of admissibility. 
Dibello. 780 P.2d at 1229. On the other 
hand, if the evidence does have an unusual 
propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or 
mislead, the presumption shifts. In such a 
case, the evidence's potential for unfair 
prejudice is presumed to outweigh its 
probativeness, and the burden is on the 
proponent to show that the evidence has 
unusual probative value. Id.; Lafferty, 749 
P.2d at 1256. We reverse the presumption in 
favor of admissibility because these 
categories of evidence are 'uniquely subject 
to being used to distort the deliberative 
process and skew a trial's outcome.' 
Dibello. 780 P.2d at 1229; accord Lafferty, 
749 P.2d at 1256. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1221-22 (emphasis added). Dunn also emphasized 
that the determination of whether the challenged evidence was 
"gruesome" was a "threshold question." Id. at 1222 n.22. 
For two reasons, the blood-stained clothing in this 
case should not be regarded as gruesome. 
First, the clothing is not abhorrent to look at. The 
victim's shirt is somewhat discolored over a large portion of its 
left side. It is patently nat gruesome. The blood stains 
covering the lower right leg and upper rear of the left leg 
contrast more clearly against the white background than does the 
blood stain on the shirt. However, the blood stains on the pants 
are not very extensive and more resemble brown paint than blood, 
and while not particularly pleasant, are not gruesome. See 
Johnson, 784 P.2d at 1141 (finding the admission of a patrolman's 
11 
blood-stained brown shirt proper). 
Second, blood-stained clothing has not been recognized 
as evidence having an unusual propensity to prejudice, inflame or 
mislead the jury. In Laffertv, the court recognized only 3 such 
categories: (1) a rape victim's past sexual activities with 
someone other than the accused; (2) statistical evidence of 
matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis; and (3) 
gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse. Id. 749 P.2d 
at 1256. In State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989), the 
Utah Supreme Court, citing Laffertv, explicitly stated that "[a] 
brown shirt with dried blood on it does not equate with the 
evidence we have previously deemed highly prejudicial." Id. at 
1141. See State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525, 526 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (1990) (refusing to find error in the trial 
court's exclusion of a homemade pornographic videotape because it 
was not within any of the specially recognized categories of 
potentially prejudicial evidence identified in Lafferty). 
Defendant cites State v. Steele. 586 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 
1978), as support for the inclusion of blood-stained clothing in 
such a special category. In fact, Steele merely notes that the 
admission gruesome objects, such as clothing, can result in a 
conviction, not by proving the elements of the crime, but by 
inflaming the passions of the jury. The same concern attaches to 
any evidence having the potential to unfairly prejudice, but does 
not elevate such evidence to a specially recognized category 
which reverses the presumption of admissibility. 
12 
Since the challenged evidence is not gruesome, this 
Court must simply balance the probative value of the evidence 
against its potential to unfairly prejudice, recognizing the 
presumption of admissibility. See State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 
984 (Utah 1989) ("'Unfair prejudice' within its context means an 
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.") (citation 
omitted). Johnson, 784 P.2d at 1141 (emphasizing that relevant 
evidence may be excluded under rule 403 only where it's probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice). 
11
 [P] hotographs that are only negligibly gruesome5 have 
little potential for unduly prejudicing the jury, and their 
admission therefore does not constitute an abuse of discretion." 
State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Pascoe, 774 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (11 photographs 
depicting auto collision scene and sheet-covered corpse 
displaying only tennis shoe-clad foot, without visible blood 
5
 The supreme court has disapproved the characterization of 
photographic evidence as either "gruesome," or "negligibly 
gruesome," in applying the test for admissibility under rule 403. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1222 n. 22. This gloss appears directed at 
whether evidence should be included within the category having an 
unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice the jury. However, the 
term, "negligibly gruesome," is useful in that it uniformly 
signals an assessment that the potential of challenged evidence 
to unfairly prejudice will not be found to substantially outweigh 
the probative value of such evidence under rule 403. In the 
remainder of this brief, the State uses the term, "negligibly 
gruesome," only to acknowledge that some persons might find the 
blood-stained clothing somewhat unpleasant to look at, but the 
potential of such evidence to unfairly prejudice is miniscule. 
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stains, found only negligibly gruesome and admissible to prove 
relevant facts). 
Similarly, blood-stained clothing which is negligibly 
gruesome should be found admissible if relevant. See State v. 
Groves, 311 So.2d 230, 239 (La. 1975) (finding nothing unusually 
gruesome about murder victim's blood-stained shirt); State v. 
Gambetta, 208 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Nev. 1945) (murder victim's blood-
stained brassiere showing bullet hole was not so gruesome so as 
to prevent its submission to the jury); State v. Henderson. 184 
P.2d 392, 408 (Ore. 1947) (finding murder victim's blood-stained 
clothing unpleasant to the sight but not so peculiarly abhorrent 
or gruesome as to deny admissibility).6 
The blood-stained clothing in this case was, at most, 
negligibly gruesome. Such evidence is admissible if probative of 
some fact in issue. In State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), 
the court stated: 
We have frequently stated and applied the 
rule that color photographs of the body of 
the victim - even photographs that are 
gruesome - are not inadmissible if they are 
probative of essential facts, even though 
they may be cumulative of other evidence. 
Id. at 63 (emphasis added); accord Pascoe 774 P.2d at 515 
6
 The very limited potential of the evidence in this case 
to unfairly prejudice may also be assessed by comparing it to 
truly gruesome evidence whose admission has been found to be 
clear error. See State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah 1986) 
(all parties conceded that the photographs of the victim lying in 
a pool of blood and of the victims wounds were very graphic and 
gruesome); Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257 (finding photographs of the 
baby's repositioned body to expose the gaping neck and blood-
covered face, the mother's bloody corpse, and a pool of blood on 
the kitchen floor, "quite gruesome"). 
14 
(quoting Garcia, 663 P.2d at 63); see also Valdez, 748 P.2d 1055 
(availability of evidence from purely testimonial sources does 
not by itself prevent the trial judge's admission of challenged 
photographs); State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (Utah 
1972) (gruesome photographs of murdered 22-month old baby, 
corroborative of other testimony, admissible where probative of 
disputed element of crime). 
Other jurisdictions have similarly found blood-stained 
clothing admissible "to show the nature of the wound, or to throw 
any relevant light on a material matter at issue." Smith v. 
State, 727 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert, denied, 
483 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 3277 (1987) (admitting murder victim's 
blood-stained dress to corroborate the physician's testimony 
concerning the location of the wounds and the manner in which 
they were inflicted); Jennings v. State, 506 P.2d 931, 935 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1973) (victim's bloody shirt admissible to corroborate 
the nature of the instrument used to produce the injury, even 
though the scar itself was displayed). 
In this case, the prosecutor asked Kevin, with the aid 
of photographs, to identify the places in which he was stabbed 
(R. 330-31; Exhibits 9-12). The prosecutor then introduced the 
victim's shirt (Exhibit 15) and pants (Exhibit 16) (R. 332), and 
asked Kevin to indicate where he had been stabbed. Kevin 
identified two points on the shirt and two points on the pants 
(R. 333-34). Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor directed his 
inquiry to Kevin's defensive maneuvers during the attack, 
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discontinuing any further reference to the challenged exhibits 
(R. 334).7 
Defendant argues that such evidence was merely 
cumulative of the victim's testimony and the photographic 
evidence. Appellant's Br. at 14. However, defendant fails to 
acknowledge the heavy burden borne by the prosecution in having 
to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. While the 
testimony of all the witnesses would admittedly have been 
sufficient to sustain a conviction, there was no better evidence 
than the clothes to prove that the victim's wounds were actually 
the result of a stabbing attack. The photographs showed sutured 
wounds, not obviously the product of a knife attack, and Dr. 
Noyes never testified that the wounds were caused by stabbing. 
Even if the clothes were exhibited to display the quantity of 
blood loss, such display would have been appropriate considering 
the prosecutor's knowledge that Dr. Noyes would testify that the 
victim's blood loss was not life threatening (R. 375). 
This Court's assessment of the trial court's admission 
of the challenged evidence should be guided by Johnson. In that 
case the defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder 
of a Utah Highway patrolman. The prosecution offered the 
patrolman's shirt to show that the defendant had shot the 
patrolman and to corroborate the patrolman's testimony. Johnson. 
784 P.2d at 1140. The trial court admitted the evidence as 
7
 The transcript relating to the blood-stained clothing is 
attached at Addendum C. 
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indicative of the patrolman's injuries. Id. The supreme court 
found that since the shirt was not evidence of who shot the 
patrolman, and since the extent of injury, proven by other 
evidence, was undisputed, fl[t]he probative value of the shirt was 
minimal at best" Id. at 1140-41. The court held, however, that 
considering the marginally prejudicial nature of the blood-
stained clothing, the probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by its potential to prejudice, thus 
finding a proper ground to uphold the trial court's ruling. Id. 
at 1141. In sum, because the facts of this case are comparable 
to those in Johnson, this Court should find that the challenged 
evidence was properly admitted. 
Even if it were error to admit the blood-stained 
clothing, the error was harmless. "[The reviewing court will] 
reverse a jury verdict only when the evidence, [viewed in a light 
most favorable to the verdict] is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he or she was convicted." State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993). • "[T]he likelihood of a different 
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine [the reviewing 
court's] confidence in the verdict." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 477 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 
(Utah 1987)) . 
Defendant argues that had the blood-stained clothing 
not been admitted, there was a reasonable likelihood that he 
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would not have been convicted of attempted murder, based 
primarily on Dr. Golding's testimony concerning his diminished 
capacity. Appellant's Br. at 15-16. 
The prosecution had to prove that defendant took a 
substantial step towards either intentionally or knowingly 
causing the death of Kevin Barney (Jury Instructions 14 and 15, 
R. 14 8-49). In closing, defendant conceded the stabbing and the 
victim's serious injury (R. 538). Three witnesses, including the 
victim, testified to defendant's threatening words and knife-
waving. Dr. Noyes testified, without challenge, that the stomach 
wound would have resulted in death if untreated (R. 373). Thus, 
the success of defendant's entire defense rested on expert 
testimony that he lacked an intentional or knowing state of mind. 
Apart from Dr. Golding's rendition of defendant's 
lamentable upbringing, the substance of his opinion was that in 
the early morning of May 23rd, defendant was in an uncontrollable 
rage precipitated by a condition not fully recognized by the 
mental health community (R. 432-36), and by the disinhibiting 
effects of drugs and alcohol taken earlier in the evening (R. 
465-67). However, even if defendant's capacity to restrain 
himself and to register awareness that he used threatening words 
was substantially diminished, Dr. Golding admitted that defendant 
would probably have known that he had a knife in his hand (R. 
486). This fact, coupled with defendant's admission to detective 
Judd that he had stabbed Kevin Barney, established beyond 
question that defendant was "aware of the existing 
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circumstances."8 
Furthermore, Dr. Golding's opinion was substantially 
disputed by Dr. Rindflesh, who opined that the DSM-III, the 
principal psychiatric diagnostic reference, did not include a 
description of the mental disorder Dr. Golding claimed for 
defendant. In closing, defendant argued the application of 
"intermittent explosive disorder" (R. 532), a condition which Dr. 
Golding never attributed to defendant and which Dr. Rindflesh 
testified did not apply to defendant (R. 499-500). 
Even if Dr. Golding's opinion had gone unchallenged, 
the jury would have had substantial reason to reject it. Rage is 
a common, even if infrequent, experience of many human beings. 
The nature of rage is its uncontrollable aspect. See Webster's 
New World Dictionary (College Ed. 1957) (defining "rage" as "a 
furious, uncontrolled anger; raving fury"). The defense was 
effectively asking the jury to find defendant mentally ill based 
on an outburst of allegedly uncontrolled anger, behavior which 
they would probably have witnessed, if not experienced, more than 
8
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103, provides, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
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rarely in their lives. 
The jury would also have had reason to distrust the 
basis of Dr. Golding's opinion. It was apparent that the opinion 
rested substantially on defendant's sister's anecdotal, hearsay 
evidence (R. 469-72). Thus the "domino" incident, apparently 
offered to show defendant's low threshold for becoming enraged 
upon trivial stimuli, might just as easily been regarded as a 
normal rage directed at a father who had evidently treated 
defendant abysmally (R. 426-27). Moreover, Dr. Golding partially 
based his opinion of defendant's diminished capacity during the 
incident on defendant's assertion that he had taken two or three 
hits of LSD within four to six hours prior to the incident (R. 
429). However, Dr. Golding did not make any serious attempt to 
verify the claim, relying instead on his already formed belief 
that defendant was a multiple substance abuser (R. 476-80). In 
fact, defendant told detective Judd that he had not taken any 
drugs (R. 383, 387). Further, there was no corroborating 
evidence that defendant was an epileptic, or that defendant's 
failure to take Dilantin would have contributed to his claimed 
diminished capacity. 
Finally, this court should recognize that the State did 
not overplay the blood-stained clothing in the course of using it 
for legitimate purposes. The victim identified the places where 
the knife penetrated the clothes. The testimony was obviously 
brief. The prosecutor did not refer to the clothing at any other 
point in the trial. See Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1055 (finding 
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harmless the admission of photographs whose evidentiary purpose 
could have been satisfied by purely testimonial sources "in light 
of the noninflammatory nature of the pictures and the lack of 
emphasis given them by the State"). 
In sum, even if the blood-stained clothing was 
gruesome, and the trial court erred in admitting it, any error in 
its admission was harmless considering the substantial evidence 
in support of defendant's guilt, the doubtfulness of defendant's 
diminished capacity defense and the lack of emphasis given to the 
clothing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7± day of April, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally/ or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly/ or with knowledge"; "recklessly/ or 
maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
Utah Court Rules Annotated 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
ADDENDUM B 
ASK THAT YOU RETURN AT 1:30 SO THAT WE CAN START PROMPTLY 
AT THAT TIME. 
(RECESS). 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE RECORD MAY SHOW WE ARE CON-
VENED IN THE STATE VERSUS THEODIS WHITE CASE OUTSIDE THE 
PRESENCE OF THE JURY AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL TO DEAL 
WITH A COUPLE OF LEGAL MATTERS. 
MS. REMAL: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: YOUR HONOR, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE 
BEST IF I STARTED. I INDICATED TO THE COURT THAT BRENDA 
CARAKER WAS A WITNESS THAT I INTENDED TO CALL. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE NAME AGAIN? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: BRENDA, C-A-R-A-K-E-R, CARAKER. 
SHE IS AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS KNOWN TO DEFENSE COUNSEL. A 
COPY OF THE REPORT WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL. 
SHE IS A PERSON WHO AT ABOUT 11:10 THAT EVENING WAS CON-
FRONTED BY MR. WHITE WITH A KNIFE. I INDICATED THAT I 
INTENDED TO CALL HER BUT HAD NEGLECTED TO MENTION HER NAME 
TO THE JURY. AND REQUEST THE RULING OF THE COURT WITH 
REGARDS TO WHETHER OR NOT SHE'D BE AVAILABLE. 
MS. REMAL: AND YOUR HONOR, I INDICATED THAT I'M 
NOT SURPRISED BY HER. I CERTAINLY AM AWARE OF HER, OF 
THIS, BEFORE. MY CONCERN, FIRST OF ALL, IS AS TO THE 
RELEVANCE OF HER TESTIMONY. AND AS MR. BLAYLOCK POINTED 
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OUT, THE TESTIMONY OF THE EVENT IS THAT SHE WAS APPARENTLY 
PREPARED TO DESCRIBE WHAT HAPPENED A COUPLE OF HOURS PRIOR 
TO THE EVENT IN QUESTION HERE. AND BASED ON THAT IT'S MY 
POSITION THAT HER TESTIMONY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE CASE. 
SECONDLY, EVEN IF THE COURT DECIDES THAT SHE IS 
RELEVANT I WOULD SIMPLY REQUEST THAT WE QUESTION THE 
JURORS WHO WERE SELECTED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY KNOW 
HER OR ARE FAMILIAR WITH HER SINCE THAT WASN'T DONE PREVI-
OUSLY BECAUSE MR. BLAYLOCK FORGOT TO MENTION HER NAME. 
THERE WAS A SECOND ISSUE THAT WE DISCUSSED AND 
THAT IS REGARDING THE BLOODY PANTS AND SHIRT OF MR. 
BARNEY'S THAT MR. BLAYLOCK INTENDS TO INTRODUCE TO THE 
COURT, IN THE CASE BEFORE THE JURY. IT IS MY ARGUMENT 
THAT THAT CLOTHING, THOSE TWO EXHIBITS, THE SHIRT AND THE 
PANTS, WHICH, AS YOU WILL SEE WHEN YOU SEE THEM, ARE QUITE 
BLOODY. THAT THEY ARE EACH MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBA-
TIVE AND UNDER RULE 403 OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE I WOULD 
ASK THE COURT TO EXCLUDE THAT. 
MY REASON FOR SAYING THAT IS, NO. 1, BECAUSE OF 
THE APPEARANCE OF THE CLOTHING THEMSELVES, IT IS QUITE 
BLOODY, I BELIEVE THAT THEY'RE INFLAMMATORY BUT, SECONDLY, 
THERE CERTAINLY IS OTHER EVIDENCE THAT MAKES, THAT PRES-
ENTS THE SAME FACTS TO THE JURY. THE OTHER EVIDENCE I 
EXPECT, AT LEAST, WILL BE THE TESTIMONY OF KEVIN BARNEY 
WHO WILL TESTIFY ABOUT WHAT WOUNDS AND HOW MANY WOUNDS HE 
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1 RECEIVED. THERE HAS BEEN ALREADY THE TESTIMONY OF MR. 
2 KEENAN AND MR. EGLESTON ABOUT THE BLOOD THAT THEY OBSERVED 
3 WHEN MR. BARNEY CAME OVER TO THEM AT THE 7-ELEVEN. 
4 AND APPARENTLY DR. NOYES, WHO IS THE DOCTOR WHO 
5 TREATED MR. BARNEY, IS GOING TO TESTIFY. CERTAINLY, HE IS 
6 GOING TO BE ABLE TO TESTIFY AS TO THE LOCATION OF THE 
7 WOUNDS, THE AMOUNT OF BLOOD THAT WAS LOST, THE PHYSICAL 
8 AFFECT OF THOSE WOUNDS ON MR. BARNEY. 
9 IT APPEARS TO ME THAT ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE FACT 
10 THAT THERE WERE OTHER SOURCES OF THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE 
11 LOCATION OF THE WOUNDS, AND EVERYTHING ABOUT THE WOUNDS, 
12 THAT ADMITTING THE BLOODY CLOTHING ON TOP OF THAT OTHER 
13 EVIDENCE IS CERTAINLY MORE BENEFICIAL THAN PROBATIVE. I 
14 MENTIONED TO THE COURT THAT ALTHOUGH THESE CERTAINLY 
15 AREN'T PHOTOGRAPHS, THEY ARE PHYSICAL EXHIBITS, THE 
16 CLOTHING. I THINK ANALOGOUS REASONING SHOULD BE USED IS 
17 THAT THAT IS USED IN CASES SUCH AS STATE V. CLOUD. WHICH 
18 IS A UTAH SUPREME COURT CASE DEALING WITH PHOTOGRAPHS OF 
19 THE BLOODY SCENE. ALTHOUGH CERTAINLY I RECOGNIZE THERE IS 
20 A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHOTOGRAPHS AND CLOTHING I THINK THE 
21 SAME REASONING APPLIES AND, THAT IS, THE COURT NEEDS TO 
22 BALANCE THE PROBATIVE VALUE AGAINST THE PREJUDICIAL VALUE 
23 IN ALSO DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE OTHER LESS 
24 PREJUDICIAL AND LESS INFLAMMATORY SOURCES FOR THE SAME 
25 INFORMATION. 
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JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. LET ME 
STATE THAT IN RELATION TO THE TESTIMONY OF BRENDA CARAKER 
MY FEELING AT THIS POINT IS THAT I WILL NOT ALLOW HER TO 
TESTIFY BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE INCIDENT WAS TWO 
HOURS EARLIER, IT WAS UNRELATED IN TIME AND PLACE, AND THE 
ONLY THING IS IT'S COINCIDENTALLY CLOSE IN TIMING AND IT 
WOULD BE INFLAMMATORY. SO I WILL NOT ALLOW THAT TESTIMONY 
IN UNLESS I DETERMINE THAT IT SHOULD BE RELEVANT ON REBUT-
TAL AFTER THE MEDICAL TESTIMONY OR OTHER TESTIMONY IN 
RELATION TO HIS STATE OF MIND. AND IF IT BECOMES RELEVANT 
THROUGH THE EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTOR THAT HE COULD HAVE 
BEEN IN THIS STATE OF MIND FOR A PERIOD OF TIME THEN IT 
MAY BE RELEVANT TO HIS STATE OF MIND. SO THE DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION WOULD BE GRANTED IN TERMS OF NOT ALLOWING HER TO 
TESTIFY IN THE DIRECT PORTION OF THE STATE'S CASE. 
IN RELATION TO THE CLOTHING OF MR. BARNEY THE 
COURT FINDS THAT THAT'S PART OF THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF 
THE CASE. AND THIS IS A CASE WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS 
ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, OR MURDER, AND 
THAT'S IN VIOLATION, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, OF 76-5-203. AND 
THE NATURE OF THE AGGRESSION IS, IN PART, ILLUSTRATED BY 
THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE CLOTHING, AND THE BLEEDING 
THAT MAY BE SHOWN ON IT--AND I HAVEN'T SEEN THE CLOTHING 
YET--IS THE RESULT, ALLEGED RESULT OF THE CONDUCT OF THE 
DEFENDANT IN RELATION TO THE CLOTHING, THEREFORE, THE 
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COURT FINDS THAT IT'S PART OF THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE 
CASE AND APPROPRIATELY ADMISSIBLE AND NOT DESIGNED TO 
INFLAME THE JURY. IT'S SIMPLY PART OF THE FACTUAL BASIS. 
SO THE CLOTHING WILL BE ADMISSIBLE AND MRS. CARAKER'S 
TESTIMONY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED WITHOUT FURTHER ORDER OF THE 
COURT. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MS. REMAL: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WE WILL BRING THE JURY IN. 
(WHEREUPON, THE JURY RETURNS TO THE COURTROOM). 
JUDGE YOUNG: MR. BLAYLOCK, YOUR NEXT WITNESS? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MR. 
STEVEN BROPHY. 
119 
H312 
ADDENDUM C 
Q AND EXHIBIT 14? 
A EXHIBIT 14 IS ANOTHER PICTURE OF THE CAR. 
THAT'S WHERE I WAS SITTING. THAT'S THE DOOR I GOT OUT OF. 
Q WOULD YOU LOOK IN THE BAG ON EXHIBIT 15, SEE IF 
YOU OBSERVE SOMETHING IN THE BAG. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LOOK INTO IT AND SEE IF YOU CAN 
IDENTIFY WHAT'S IN THE BAG. 
THE WITNESS: THIS IS THE SHIRT I WAS WEARING 
THAT NIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU OFFER EXHIBIT 15? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: WE'D OFFER EXHIBIT 15. 
MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, I DO OBJECT ON THE 
GROUNDS WE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED ON THE RECORD. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THE OBJECTION'S OVER-
RULED. THE EXHIBIT'S RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 15 WAS OFFERED AND 
RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE). 
Q (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) WOULD YOU LOOK AT EXHIBIT 16 
IN THE BAG AND SEE IF YOU CAN IDENTIFY IT? 
A I SEE MY PANTS FIRST. THESE ARE THE PANTS THAT 
I WAS WEARING THAT NIGHT. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: WE'D OFFER EXHIBIT 16. 
MS. REMAL: YOUR HONOR, I OBJECT ON THE SAME 
GROUNDS THAT WE DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY ON THE RECORD. 
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JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THE OBJECTION IS 
OVERRULED AND THE EXHIBIT IS RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 16 WAS OFFERED AND 
RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE). 
THE WITNESS: MY UNDERWEAR ARE ALSO IN HERE THAT 
I WAS WEARING TOO. 
Q (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) JAKE, WILL YOU LOOK AT YOUR 
SHIRT FIRST, EXHIBIT 15? 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME ASK THIS QUESTION, COUNSEL. 
I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE PANTS AND THE SHIRT. THE 
UNDERWEAR THAT HE WAS WEARING THAT ARE PUT IN THERE WERE 
NOT A PART OF THE--
MR. BLAYLOCK: THEY'RE NOT OFFERED. WE'LL WITH-
DRAW THAT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THEY ARE WITHDRAWN AND THEY'LL BE 
TAKEN FROM THE EXHIBIT. 
Q (BY MR. BLAYLOCK) WOULD YOU INDICATE ON THE 
SHIRT WHERE YOU WERE STABBED? 
A WELL, THEY HAD TO CUT IT RIGHT DOWN THE MIDDLE 
SO IT WAS THIS, ACTUALLY LOOKS LIKE THIS IS THE, MIGHT BE 
THE STAB WOUND RIGHT HERE WHERE IT STABBED THROUGH MY 
SHIRT AND RIGHT HERE IS ANOTHER HOLE. YOU CAN'T REALLY 
TELL ANYTHING 'CAUSE THEY ARE SHORT SLEEVES. THERE IS 
ANOTHER HOLE UP HERE IN THE LEFT SLEEVE. 
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1 Q IF YOU'D LOOK AT THE PANTS NOW. WILL YOU INDI-
2 CATE WHERE YOU WERE STABBED? 
3 A OKAY. ON THE LEFT LEG, RIGHT HERE IS WHERE I 
4 GOT STABBED IN THE THIGH, THE LEFT THIGH. AND ON THE 
5 RIGHT LEG ON THE BOTTOM THERE'S A HOLE TOO. 
6 Q WAS THAT WHERE YOU WERE STABBED? 
7 A YES. 
8 Q HOW MANY TIMES WERE YOU STABBED ALL TOGETHER? 
9 A EIGHT TIMES. 
10 Q WHAT WERE YOU DOING WHILE THIS WAS OCCURRING? 
11 A I WAS TRYING TO BLOCK THE--AS HE WAS STABBING AT 
12 ME I WAS TRYING TO BLOCK THE STABS. 
13 Q WHAT WERE YOU BLOCKING WITH? 
14 A WELL, AT FIRST, UHM, AT FIRST I WAS LIKE THIS 
15 AND THEN--
16 Q YOU ARE HOLDING YOUR HANDS UP, BASICALLY IN 
17 FRONT OF YOUR FACE AT SOMEWHAT OF AN ANGLE. 
18 A YEAH, LIKE THAT. AND THEN I LEANED BACK AND 
19 STARTED TRYING TO KICK HIM WITH MY FEET, TRYING TO GET HIM 
20 OFF OF ME. 
21 Q WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF YOUR KICKING? 
22 A NOT VERY WELL. I GOT STABBED IN THE LEGS WHILE 
23 I WAS TRYING TO KICK HIM, SO . . . 
24 Q WAS THE DEFENDANT SAYING ANYTHING WHILE HE WAS 
25 I STABBING YOU? 
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